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1 Introduction
Being the ﬁrst ﬁrm to enter a market may be advantageous – for instance, when
consumers are uncertain about product quality.1 If only the pioneering brand’s
quality is known by consumers after subsequent entry, there is informational
productdifferentiation: consumersknowtheincumbent’squality,butareuncertain
about the entrant’s. This paper explores two issues in such a setting.
The ﬁrst question under consideration is thefollowing: Howdo lock-ineffects
inﬂuence the possibilities for entry in markets for search goods? A consumer
who visits a store and ﬁnds out that product quality is too low given the price
that is charged, may switch to another seller, provided that the cost of switching
is not too high. There is a variety of examples of products that have quality as
a search-characteristic. Fruit vendors often allow consumers to inspect the fruit
before buying. Stores selling audio equipment provide demonstrations for clients
to help them decide. Automobile sellers allow consumers to make test drives
so that quality assessments can be made. Switching costs arise, for instance,
when visiting another seller takes considerable time – so that future beneﬁts are
discounted.
The second question concerns the distribution of information. In markets
for search goods, is the incumbent better off if he can observe the quality of an
entrant? Thissituationgivesrisetoasignalingproblemwithcommoninformation.
In a model in which the ﬁrms simultaneously choose prices, the prices of both
ﬁrms, rather than only the entrant’s price, serve as signals of the entrant’s type to
consumers. The assumption that an incumbent ﬁrm is informed about the quality
of an entrant’s product or service corresponds to various situations. For instance,
ﬁrms may have more expertise than consumers, as is the case for technically
complicated products. Alternatively, professionals may have knowledge about
each other’s performance because of a common history, such as having shared
their education.
1Thisis, forexample, thecase inmarketsforsearch goodsandinmarketsforexperience goods.
Search goods can be inspected to make a quality assessment before purchase, whereas the quality
of experience goods is learned after a purchase. The distinction between experience goods and
search goods was made by Nelson [16].2
The ﬁrst question is explored under the assumption that the entrant is privately
informed about his type. An important observation is that a sufﬁciently high price
signals high quality. To see this, suppose the entrant’s price is so high that a
consumer who ﬁnds out that quality is low, will switch to the incumbent; such a
price will convince consumers of high quality. Under low switching costs, in a
separating equilibrium consumers can visit the incumbent if the entrant’s quality
turns out to be lower than expected. Therefore it makes no sense for a low-quality
seller to mimic a high type, and a ﬁrm of higher quality than the incumbent can
enter themarketand makeproﬁts. In a regimeofsufﬁciently high switching costs,
the incumbent can deter entry of a high-quality seller: fear of lock-in creates an
entry barrier.
Poolingequilibriaexistonlyifswitchingcostsaresufﬁcientlyhigh. Toseethis,
consider a regime of low switching costs, and note that in a pooling equilibrium
the entrant charges an “intermediate” price (in accordance with consumers’ prior
beliefs). Since a sufﬁcientlyhigh price signals high quality, a high-qualityentrant
could deviate by increasing his price.
To answer the second question, I analyze the model under the assumption that
theincumbentobservestheentrant’squality. Iftheincumbent’spriceisinformative
about the entrant’s type, then the entrant has a large degree of freedom in its price
choice, since he can rely on his rival’s price to inform consumers. In the light of
thisobservation,onecanarguethatthenotionofperfectBayesianequilibrium(and
also sequential equilibrium) allows for unreasonable equilibria. In order to rule
these out, I apply (a customized version of) Bagwell and Ramey’s [2] reﬁnement
of “unprejudiced” sequential equilibrium. This criterion captures the idea that if
one of the ﬁrmschooses an out-of-equilibriumsignal, while its rival’sequilibrium
signal is informative, consumers will rely on the equilibrium signal.
The incumbent is not able to exploit private information about the entrant in
a proﬁtable way, that is, he cannot improve upon his situation if he observes the
entrant’s quality. The intuition is that the entrant, knowing that the incumbent can
observe histype and that consumersrealize this, faces less difﬁcultyin convincing
consumers of high quality. Additionally, entry is facilitated if the incumbent’s
price contains information about the entrant’s quality, no matter how severe lock-3
in effects. In this case an informative incumbent’s price helps the entrant to
circumvent lock-in effects and incentive-compatibilityproblems.
There is some closely relatedliteratureon entryandquality uncertainty. Dem-
setz [6] argued that in markets for experience goods, promotional pricing (that
is, below marginal cost) by an entrant may be necessary to induce consumers to
try his product. Accordingly, the entrant incurs “information costs,” that may be
recouped when consumers purchase at a higher price after having experienced his
quality. Schmalensee [17], Farrell [7], and Bagwell [1] formally examined the
difﬁculty faced by a potential entrant to persuade consumers that he sells a high-
quality product. The informationalasymmetry may result in an entry barrier, even
if the entrant’s expected quality is higher than the incumbent’s quality. My paper
differs in two important ways. First, whereas the literature cited above considers
experience goods, I examine markets for search goods. In my model, switching
costs play a crucial role: due to lock-in effects, high prices signal quality, instead
of low prices in markets for experience goods.2 The second difference is that I
study also the case in which the entrant’s type is common information.
Some literatureinvestigates games with common information,although issues
of quite different nature are under study. Matthews and Fertig [13] study wasteful
advertising by an incumbent and an entrant, both informed about the latter’s
quality, in a market for experience goods.3 The entrant, and subsequently the
incumbent, select advertising expenditures that determine consumers’ beliefs.
Thenentryoccursautomaticallyandtheﬁrmsplayaduopolygameinwhichbeliefs
affect demand levels. The entrant may have difﬁculty trying to inﬂuence beliefs
becausetheincumbent(thesecond-mover)cancounteract. BagwellandRamey[2]
investigate limit pricing by two incumbents, both informed about an industry cost
parameter. They impose “unprejudiced” beliefs, which poses a restriction on
beliefs for signaling games with common information. Milgrom and Roberts [15]
2NoticethedifferencewithKlemperer[10],alsoonentrydeterrenceinthepresenceofswitching
costs. In his model, a consumer who previously bought from the incumbent incurs a cost if he
decides to purchase from the entrant.
3The literature in which ﬁrms signal quality by wasteful advertising is based on ideas in
Nelson [16]; see Milgrom and Roberts [14].4
study competition among interested parties with common information, who try
to persuade a decisionmaker to make a particular decision. These parties can
only report truthful information. The main result is that competition leads to the
full-informationoutcome. In my model, however, instead of disclosing, the ﬁrms
signal their information.
The model is presented in section 2. The model under the assumption that
the entrant is privately informed is analyzed in section 3. Next, in section 4, I
investigate what happens if the incumbent can observe the entrant’s quality, while
consumers are still uncertain. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a market with an incumbent (ﬁrm 1), and a potential entrant (ﬁrm 2).
Entry is costless. The incumbent’s quality is known to be low, and is denoted by
q1 = q`. Theentrant’squalityis denotedbyq2 2f q `;q hg,w h e r eq h>q `>0 .T h e
entrant’squality isdeterminedby Nature,which selectsqualityqh withprobability
 2 (0;1).
The unit cost of producing low quality is c`  0, whereas producing high
quality costs ch >c `per unit. Higher quality generates a higher surplus:
qh − ch >q `−c `>0 : (1)
As in Bagwell [1], the parameter assumptions favor entry. That is, ﬁrm 1 has
no scaleeconomiesor cost advantage, ﬁrm2’sproduct qualityisequal to or higher
than the quality of theincumbent’s product,and thereis no cost of entry (the “pro-
entry” assumption). This assumption makes it possible to focus on informational
product differentiation and lock-in effects as possible sources of entry barriers.
Following Bagwell, entry is said to be deterred if a high-quality ﬁrm does not
attract consumers who are uncertain about its quality.
Qualities and costs are ﬁxed during the game. The ﬁrms, who maximize
expected proﬁts, compete by simultaneously setting prices p1 and p2 that cannot
bechanged afterwards. In section 3, only the entrant observes histype, whereas in5
section4, bothﬁrmsobserve theentrant’stypebeforesettingprices. The expected
proﬁts of ﬁrm i are denoted by i.
The number of consumers is normalized to 1. A consumers buys at most one
unit. A product of quality q at price p yields utility q − p. The reservation utility
level is0 and consumersmaximizeexpected net beneﬁts. The social welfarelevel,
denotedbyW, isdeﬁnedasthesum ofproducers’surplusandconsumers’surplus.
Initially, a consumer has information (p1;p 2). In order to ﬁnd out q2,h eh a s
to visit the entrant’s outlet. Consumers’ beliefs after having observed prices are
denoted by (p1;p 2), which is the probabilityattached to theevent that theentrant
sells a high quality product. If a consumer who observes the quality during a visit
decides not to buy but to visit the other ﬁrm, he incurs a switching cost: future
beneﬁts are discounted by a factor  2 [0;1].4
The structure of the model is common knowledge. In particular, if the incum-
bent is informedabout theentrant’stype, then the entrantand theconsumersknow
this.
The sequence of events is as follows. First, Nature selects the quality of
the potential entrant. Second, the two ﬁrms simultaneously set prices, which
are observed by the consumers. Third, consumers (who know the quality of the
incumbent,butareuncertainabouttheentrant’squality)decidewhichﬁrmto visit.
Since quality is observed before purchase, consumers can switch from the entrant
to the incumbent (and incur a switching cost) if they ﬁnd out that the entrant sells
a low-quality product.
The notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium of Fudenberg and Tirole [8] is
used to solve for pure strategy equilibia. A strategy of ﬁrm i is a function pi(q2),
i =1 ;2 . Equilibrium prices are denoted by p
1() and p
2().5 Note that if ﬁrm 1
cannot observe ﬁrm 2’s type, p1(q2) cannot depend on q2, and consumers’ beliefs
4This way of modeling switching costs is derived from Bester [4]. A higher value of 
corresponds to lower switching costs.
5Since setting price below marginal cost is a dominated strategy, consumers will interpret a
price below the unit cost of producing high quality as a signal of low quality. Also, a ﬁrm that
produces low quality has no incentive to charge a price higher than the consumers’ reservation
valueforlow quality. The rangeof p1(q2), q2 2f q `;q hg, and the range of p2(q`) willbe restricted
to [c`;q `], and the range of p2(qh) to [ch;q h].6
(p1;p 2)cannot depend on p1 (see also section 3). A consumer’s strategy will be
informally described by his visiting and purchasing behavior.





2(qh). Prices are uninformative in a pooling equilibrium, that is,
p
1(q`)=p 
1( q h)and p
2(q`)=p 
2( q h) .
In the ﬁrst-best outcome, a high-quality entrant attracts consumers. This
outcome is attained for  =1 , a situation, effectively, of complete information:
consumers can costlessly search. Prices in this outcome are p
1(q`)=p 
2 ( q ` )=
p 
1 ( q h )=c ` ,a n dp 
2 ( q h )=c `+ q h−q ` . Expected proﬁts are 
1 =0and

2 = (c` + qh − q` − ch). The ﬁrst-best welfare level WFB equals
W
FB =(qh−c h)+( 1− )(q` − c`):
3 Lock-In Effects and Quality Uncertainty
Following the informational assumptions made in most of the literature, I assume
in thissection that the entrant has privateinformationabout his type. Consequent-
ly, consumers and the incumbent are uncertain about the entrant’s quality.
Preliminary Remarks
Since the incumbent cannot observe the type of a potential entrant, his price can-
not convey information about the entrant’s quality to consumers. The notation p1
will be used instead of p1(q2). Accordingly, if one considers deviations by the
incumbent, consumer beliefs cannot vary with the incumbent’s price.6
Assumption 3.1 Given an equilibrium price p
2(q2), consumers’ beliefs satisfy
(p1;p 
2(q 2)) = (p0
1;p 
2(q 2)) for all p1 6= p0
1.
6This is the“no-signaling-what-you-don’t-know”conditionof perfect Bayesian equilibrium: a
player’s deviation shouldnot signal informationthat he himself does not have (see Fudenberg and
Tirole[8]). This conditionis implied bythe consistency requirement of thesequential equilibrium
concept of Kreps and Wilson [12].7
Intuitively, the incumbent and consumers have exactly the same information
(namely the prior distribution), so that the incumbent’s price p1 cannot direct-
ly inﬂuence consumers’ beliefs.
Suppose that the difference between high and low quality is relatively high,
that is, qh−q` >q `−c `.L e tp 
1c `be given. The best response of ahigh-quality
entrant is a price p
2 = p
1 +qh −q`.S i n c ep 
2c `+q h−q `>q `,p r i c ep 
2signals
high quality because of assumption 3.1. Consumers are indifferent between the
two ﬁrms. However, they visit the entrant; otherwise he could slightly decrease
p
2. Switching costs or informational asymmetries do not play a role under this
parameter constellation: the price of a high-quality entrant is always larger than
the reservation value for low quality. To focus on more interesting cases, I will
assume throughout the paper that the difference between high and low quality is
not too high, that is,
qh − q`  q` − c`: (2)
Prices play a particular role. The entrant knows that consumers can get utility
levelq`−p
1 by purchasing from ﬁrm1. Moreover, he knows that a consumer who
ﬁnds out that he sells low quality will switch to the incumbent if prices are such
that
q` − p2 < ( q `−p

1) : (3)
Accordingly,any pricep2 >q `− ( q `−p 
1)is dominatedforalow-qualityentrant,
while this is not necessarily the case for a high-quality ﬁrm. Therefore, given
equilibriumpricep
1 (rationallyexpected byconsumers andﬁrm 2inequilibrium),
apricep 2thatsatisﬁes(3)shouldconvinceconsumersthatﬁrm2sellshighquality.




1for all p2 such that q` − p2 < ( q `−p 
1) .
Analysis
7Assumption3.2 is an equilibriumreﬁnement stronglyincliningto theDominance Criterionof
Cho and Kreps [5] and the “independence of never a weak best response” (INWBR) criterion of






2(q h)) = 1. One can easily see that p
1 = p
2(q`)=c `. The reason is
that a price p
1 >c `will be undercut by the low-quality entrant with a price p2 just
below p
1, which in turn gives ﬁrm 1 an incentive to deviate.
Supposethatin equilibriumahigh-qualitysellerentersand attractsconsumers.
Two conditions must then hold. First,
qh − p
2(qh)  q` − p
1: (4)
That is, the entrant must offer a better deal than does the incumbent. Second,
q` − p

2(qh) < ( q `−p

1) : (5)
The interpretation is that if a consumer ﬁnds low quality in the entrant’s store, he
must switch to the incumbent. Hence, a low-quality entrant has no incentive to
pretend that he sells high quality. From (4) and (5) it follows that a necessary
condition for existence of a separating equilibrium in which a high-quality ﬁrm
enters is > 1,w h e r e 1is deﬁned by




and satisﬁes 0  1 < 1.
Suppose that > 1. Can an outcome in which a high-quality ﬁrm enters be
supported as an equilibrium? Consider prices p
1 = c` and p
2(qh)=c `+q h−q `,
and beliefs (p
1;p 2)=0if p2  q` − (q` − p
1),a n d ( p 
1;p 2)=1otherwise. In
particular, these beliefs satisfy assumptions 3.1 and 3.2. Suppose that consumers
visit the entrant if they observe prices p
1 and p
2(qh). Clearly, these strategies and
beliefs constitute an equilibrium. Moreover, by assumption 3.2 it cannot be that
p
2(qh) <c `+q h−q `.
Now suppose that   1. If an equilibrium exists, then the incumbent deters




2(qh)  c` + qh − q`. Since the incumbent should have no incentive to increase
his price, it must be that p
2(qh)=c `+q h−q ` . With the same beliefs as in an
equilibrium with entry, none of the ﬁrms will deviate.
Summarizing, we have the following proposition:9
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. For any ,t h e r e
exists a unique separating equilibrium:




c `+ q h− q ` ; 
1=0and 
2 = (c` + qh − q` − ch); the ﬁrst-best welfare level
W = W FB is attained.




2(qh)=c `+q h−q `; 
1= 
2=0 ;s i n c eW=q `−c `, an inefﬁciency
exists.
According to proposition 3.1, entry of a high-quality seller is possible if and
only if switching costs are sufﬁciently low.8 In this case, consumers’ surplus is
maximal, and theﬁrst-best welfarelevel is attained. The range(1;1] in which the
ﬁrst-best outcome can be supported as an equilibrium, increases as qh − q` gets
larger, or as q` − c` gets smaller.
If thelock-in effect is severe, an entry barrierexists that causes an inefﬁciency.
Consumer are indifferent between the incumbent and the high-quality entrant. In
equilibriumhowever, they must visit theincumbent, since otherwisea low-quality
seller could mimic a high-quality ﬁrm and the consumer would be locked in.
Consumers’ surplus equals q` − c` for any level of . In a regime of low
switching costs, the price of a high-quality entrant is a markup over marginal
costs, reducing consumers’ surplus to the same level as under high switching
costs.




2( q h) . By Bayes’ rule, consumers’ beliefs satisfy
(p
1;p 
2)= . Since independently of ﬁrm 1’s price, a price p2 <c hsignals low
quality, and a pricep2 >q `high quality, it must be thatch  p
2  ql. Necessarily,
ch  q` must hold.
If the entrant captures the market, then the incumbent does not make any
proﬁts. If ﬁrm 1 serves the market then it charges a price p
1 = c`;o t h e r w i s ea
low-qualityentrantcould undercutp
1 and attract consumers. Consequently, ﬁrm1
8It is shown below that no poolingequilibriaexist if> 1, so that this separating equilibrium
is then the uniqueequilibrium.10
earns zero proﬁts in any pooling equilibrium outcome.
By assumption 3.2, any price p2 that satisﬁes q`−p2  (q`−p
1) signals high
quality. Therefore, in any pooling equilibrium
p
2 <q `− ( q `−p 
1) : (7)
Additionally,ahigh-qualityentrant must not be ableto offera morefavorabledeal
than the incumbent by charging a price that convinces consumers of high quality,
that is, qh − p2  q` − p








There exists a price p
1  c` satisfying (8) if and only if   1.
Inequality (7) implies that when the entrant’s price signals no information
about his quality, consumers who ﬁnd out that he sells low quality will not switch
to the incumbent. Thus if the entrant attracts consumers, they take into account
that they may end up buying a low-quality product at a fairly high price.11
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. Pooling equilibria
(with and without entry) exist if and only if   1 and   (ch − c`)=(qh − q`):
(i)Ifentryoccursthenp
1 2 [c`;q `−(q h−q `)=(1−)]andp
2 2 [ch;c `+(q h−q `)]
such thatq`−p





the ﬁrst-best welfare level W FB is attained.
(ii) If entry is deterred thenp
1 = c` and p
2 = c`+(qh−q`); 
1 = 
2=0 ;s i n c e
W=q `−c `, an inefﬁciency exists.
Proof: See the appendix.
Toconcludethissection,IwilldiscussanimportantdifferencewithBagwell[1]
in more detail. That paper investigates an experience good market in which
consumers know that the incumbent sells a low-quality good, whereas consumers
and the incumbent are uncertain about the entrant. A reputation for high quality
can be established by the entrant in the ﬁrst of two periods. To signal its quality,
a high-quality ﬁrm should select a price in the ﬁrst period so low that it results in
negative proﬁts (in that period) only for the high-quality type. Thus, low prices
may signal high quality.9 In Bagwell’s model there is an entry barrier if the initial
sacriﬁceofsuchalowpriceisprohibitivelyhigh;alowpriceisacostlysignal. The
model of this paper demonstrates that in markets for search goods with switching
costs, a sufﬁciently high price signals high quality. Setting a price high enough
so that a consumer who ﬁnds out that quality is low will switch, is a means to
convince consumers of high quality.
9This argument goes throughbecause all consumers are uninformed about theentrant’s quality
ex ante. See Bagwell and Riordan [3] for a model in which some consumers are informed, and
high prices signal quality.12
4 Prices Signal Common Information
This section investigates thecase in which theincumbentcan observetheentrant’s
quality,while consumersarestill uncertain. Assumption 3.1, no longer justiﬁable,
is dropped. For prices p
1  p
1(q`)=p 
1( q h) , the intuition and motivation behind
assumption 3.2 still holds. A slightly modiﬁed version of this assumption will be
applied:
Assumption 4.1 Given equilibrium prices p
1  p
1(q`)=p 
1 ( q h ) , consumers’
beliefs satisfy (p
1;p 2)=1for all p2 such that q` − p2 < ( q `−p 
1) .
In a separating equilibrium, at least one of the ﬁrms’ prices is informative
about ﬁrm 2’s type, that is, p
i(q`) 6= p
i(qh) for at least one i. Equilibrium beliefs
are (p
1(q`);p 
2(q `)) = 0 and (p
1(qh);p 
2(q h)) = 1.
The fact that two ﬁrms try to signal common information may lead to unrea-
sonable equilibria. The following example demonstrates this.
Example Free riding on the incumbent’s signal
Consider prices p
i(q`) 6= p
i(qh), i =1 ;2(see ﬁgure 1). Let p
1(q`)=p 
2( q `)=c `.
Suppose that q` − p
1(qh)=q h−p 
2( q h)and consumers visit the incumbent after
observing price combination (p
1(qh);p 
2(q h)). Let consumer beliefs be such that
ﬁrm 2 has no incentive to decrease its price, that is,
(p

1(qh);p 2)q h+( 1− ( p





2( q h) :
For instance, (p
1(qh);p 2)=0for all p2 <p 
2 ( q h ) ; if the high-quality entrant
would reduce his price, consumers would believe that he sells low quality. It must
also hold that p
1(qh)  ch, so that a price decreasep2 belowthe incumbent’s price
(with the purpose to be taken for a low-quality seller) does not pay. Accordingly,
we have an equilibrium.13

















Notice that in the example, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt equals 
1 = (p
1(qh) − c`); higher
than in any equilibrium in the model of the previous section. Accordingly, one
might conclude that having moreinformation can be beneﬁcial for the incumbent.
However, the beliefs supporting the equilibrium given in the example above
raise serious doubts. If ﬁrm 2 slightly decreases its price to p2 (see ﬁgure 1),
a consumer who observes (p
1(qh);p 2)can deduce the entrant’s quality from the
incumbent’s price. To see this, notice that the entrant knows that the incumbent
observes q2, and that consumers realize this. Since p
1(q`) 6= p
1(qh), the incum-
bent’s price remains informative about the entrant’s type if the entrant deviates.
Consumers may therefore reason that ﬁrm 1 would not have selected p
1(qh) if
ﬁrm 2’s quality is low. Consequently, prices (p
1(qh);p 2)should make consumers
believe that ﬁrm 2 sells high quality. Since qh − p2 >q `−p 
1( q h) , the entrant can
“free ride” on the incumbent’s signal.10
10The concept of sequential equilibrium does not eliminate the equilibrium in the example.
Consider,for thesake of argument, discrete prices (theformal deﬁnitionof sequential equilibrium
only applies to games with ﬁnite strategy spaces). Suppose thatthe set of possible prices for ﬁrm i
is fp
i(q`);p 
i(q h);p ig,f o rs o m ep i2( p 
i( q `) ;p 
i(q h)). We will check whether the equilibrium
strategies p
i() satisfy the consistency requirement of sequential equilibrium. If q2 = q`,l e t
ﬁrm i tremble (choose each price different from p
i(q`)) with probability ">0 .I f q 2= q h ,
let ﬁrm 1 tremble with probability ", and ﬁrm 2 with probability "3. What should a consumer
who observes prices (p
1(qh);p 2)believe? Beliefs deﬁned by Bayes’ rule from the set of com-14
The example demonstrates that the equilibrium notion needs further reﬁne-
ment. Bagwell and Ramey [2] give a similar example (in a limit-pricing model
with multiple incumbents), which suggests that “free riding on the rival’s signal”
is a general problem when there is common information. They formulate a re-
strictiononbeliefsforsignalinggameswithcommoninformation(“unprejudiced”
beliefs).11 For convenience, I use a different but equivalent formulation of their
criterion. To do so, a deﬁnition is given:
Deﬁnition In an equilibrium with prices p
1(q2) and p
2(q2), q2 2f q ` ;q hg,p r i c e
vector (p1;p 2)is said to be weakly consistent with q2 2f q `;q hgif there exists an
i 2f 1 ;2 gsuch that pi = p
i(q2).
Intherestofthispaper,beliefsinaperfectBayesianequilibriumhavetosatisfy
assumption 4.1 and the following criterion:
Assumption 4.2 Letequilibriumpricesp
1(q2)andp
2(q2),q2 2f q `;q hg, begiven.
(i) Consider prices p1;p 2 2[c `;q `].I f( p 1;p 2)is weakly consistent with q`, but not
with qh, then (p1;p 2)=0 .
(ii) Consider prices p1 2 [c`;q `]and p2 2 [ch;q h].I f( p 1 ;p 2)is weakly consistent
with qh, but not with q`, then (p1;p 2)=1 .
Assumption 4.2 explicitly takes into account the common information aspect
of the game. In the example above, (p
1(qh);p 2)is weakly consistent with qh,b u t
not with q`. Consequently, after observing equilibrium price p
1(qh) and deviation
p2, consumersbelieve that theentrantsells highquality. Sinceit is sufﬁcienttopin
pletely mixed strategies are "(p
1(qh);p 2)=[  (1 − 2")"3]=[(1 − 2")"3 +( 1− ) " 2] :Now
lim"!0"(p
1(qh);p 2)=0 ,i.e., theconsistencyrequirementissatisﬁed. AsarguedinBagwelland
Ramey [2], requiring that all trembles have the same magnitude wouldeliminate the equilibrium.
11Bagwell and Ramey [2] provide a somewhat different motivation for their beliefs restriction.
In my example, their argument would be that consumers observing (p
1(qh);p 2)should believe
that the entrant’s quality is high because then one deviation instead of two occurred; consumers
should not be “prejudiced” in believing that any deviation is more likely than any other. Their
notionof unprejudicedsequentialequilibriumrequires thata deviantpricepair is rationalizedwith
the fewest deviations.15
down out-of-equilibrium beliefs only for slight deviations, a weaker formulation
of the reﬁnement criterion will also satisfy.
The appendix derives necessary conditions on informative equilibrium prices
(lemmas4.1-4.3). Iwillbrieﬂydiscusssomeofthem. First,iftheincumbentdeters
entry of a high-quality seller, then the incumbent’s price must be uninformative,
that is, p
1(q`)=p 
1 ( q h ) . This result generalizes the example above and is a
direct consequence of the application of the reﬁnement criterion. An informative
price strategy by ﬁrm 1 that deters entry cannot occur in equilibrium, since it
allows a high-quality entrant to convince consumers of high quality and attract
consumers. An implication is that an incumbent that wants to adopt a “tough”
posture (in the sense of making entry difﬁcult) should not employ a strategy
conveying information about an entrant to consumers. Second, if a high-quality
seller captures the market, then p
1(q`)  p
1(qh); the incumbent sets an equally or
more aggressive price if he faces a high-quality rival.
Proposition 4.1 Supposethat assumptions4.1 and 4.2 hold. Forany,there exist
exactly two separating equilibria:




1( q h)=c `,p 
2( q `)=c `, and p
2(qh)=c `+q h−q ` ;
 
1=0and
2 = (c`+qh−q`−ch); theﬁrst-best welfarelevelW FBisattained.
(ii) If   1 then there exists a separating equilibrium in which the incumbent
deters entry of a high-quality ﬁrm, and p
1  p
1(q`)=p 
1( q h)=c `,p 
2( q `)=c `,
and p
2(qh)=c `+q h−q `; 
1= 
2=0 ;s i n c eW=q `−c `, an inefﬁciencyexists.
(iii) For any  there exists a separating equilibrium in which each type of entrant
attracts consumers; in this equilibrium p
1(q`)=c `+ q h− q ` ,p 
1 ( q h )=c ` ,
p 
2p 
2 ( q ` )=p 
2( q h )=c `+q h−q `; 
1=0and 
2 = c` + qh − q` − ch;t h e
ﬁrst-best welfare level W FB is attained.
Proof: (i) For necessary conditions on the prices when a high-qualityﬁrm enters,
see lemmas 4.1 and 4.3 in the appendix. Given that p
1  p
1(q`)=p 
1 ( q h ) ,t h e
proof of proposition 3.1 (i) applies to show that > 1is necessary and sufﬁcient.
Beliefs (p1;p 
2(q `)) = 0 and (p1;p 
2(q h)) = 1, 8 p1, satisfy the reﬁnement
criterion.16
(ii) For necessary conditions on the prices when entry is deterred, see lemmas 4.1
and 4.2. Since p
1  p
1(q`)=p 
1( q h) , the proof of proposition 3.1 (ii) applies to
show that   1 is necessary and sufﬁcient. As in (i), beliefs satisfy assumptions
4.1 and 4.2.
(iii)Seelemmas4.1 and 4.3. Onecan supporttheequilibriumprices, forany value
of , with beliefs (p
1(q`);p 2)=08p 2 ; ( p 
1 ( q h ) ;p 2)=18p 2 ; ( p 1;p 
2)=1
8p 1<p 
1( q `) ;a n d ( p 1;p 
2)=08p 1p 
1( q `) . If consumers do not visit ﬁrm 2
in equilibrium, then ﬁrm 2 can slightly decrease its price and attract consumers –
a contradiction.
In parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition, the incumbent’s price is uninformative.
Accordingly, the lock-in effect plays the same role as in the model of the previous
section, which contains a discussion.
Part (iii) of proposition 4.1 shows that, contrary to the model of the previous
section, for any value of  there exists a separating equilibrium with entry. In this
equilibrium, the incumbent’s price reveals the entrant’s type to consumers. The
reason that the lock-ineffectdoes not play a roleis that alow-qualityentrant alone
cannot mimic a high-quality type, since the incumbent’s price would still inform
consumers that the entrant sells low quality. The incumbent charges a relatively
high price to signal that the entrant sells low quality, and a relatively low price
in the opposite case.12 Note that the ﬁrst-best welfare level is attained in this
outcome.
Anypoolingequilibriumofthemodelintheprevioussectionisalsoanequilib-
rium in this model (the only difference is that assumption 3.1 has been dropped).
Because of the larger degree of freedom in deﬁning consumer beliefs out of equi-
librium, additional pooling equilibria may exist. In particular, pooling equilibria
exist for any  2 (0;1).
12Thereisan argumentagainstthisequilibrium. InthespiritofGrossmanandPerry’s[9]perfect
sequential equilibrium, beliefs (p1;p 
2)=1for p1 2 (p
1(qh);p 
1(q `)) are not reasonable. Since
ﬁrm 1 attracts no consumers in equilibrium, each “type” of incumbent has the same incentive to
select a price p1 <p 
1( q `) . Therefore after a deviation by ﬁrm 1, consumers should not draw any
conclusion about the entrant’s quality: (p1;p 
2)= . Then ﬁrm 1 is able to attract consumers by
deviating.17
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 hold. Pooling equilibria
(with and without entry) exist if and only if   1:
(i)Ifentryoccursthenp
1 2 [c`;q `−(q h−q `)=(1−)]andp







the ﬁrst-best welfare level W FB is attained.
(ii) If entry is deterred then p
1 = c` and p
2 2 [ch;c `+q h−q `]such that p
2 
c` + (qh − q`) and (7); 
1 = 
2=0 ;s i n c eW=q `−c `, an inefﬁciency exists.
Proof: See the appendix.
To conclude this section, I will make a comparison with the results of the pre-
vioussection. Ifoneconsidersseparatingequilibria,foranyvalueof theswitching
cost parameter there exists an additional separating equilibrium under common
information(theequilibriumgiveninproposition4.1(iii)). Inthisadditionalequi-
librium entry occurs. Accordingly, whereas without common information entry
cannot occur if the lock-in effect is severe (see proposition 3.1 (ii)), the fact that
the incumbent is informed may help the entrant to circumvent the adverse selec-
tion problem. From a welfare point of view, common information may restore
efﬁciency for sufﬁciently high switching costs (compare propositions 3.1 (ii) and
4.1 (iii)).
Considering pooling equilibria, under common information there exist equi-
libria with and without entry in a larger parameter range. One cannot, however,
draw conclusions concerning the possibilities of entry as clear-cut as in the case
of separating equilibria. Under common information, however, it is possible that
if entry occurs the entrant charges a higher price than in any pooling equilibri-
um without common information. As a consequence the incumbent’s additional
information may increase the entrant’s proﬁts and decrease consumers’ surplus.
A direct consequence of propositions 4.1 and 4.2 is that the incumbent cannot
beneﬁt from observing the entrant’s quality. At ﬁrst sight, this result may look
surprising. One would perhaps expect that it would be advantegous for the in-
cumbent ﬁrm to have this information.13 Intuitively, the entrant, who knows that
13For instance, Bagwell [1] presumed (in a model with experience goods, see the discussion18
the incumbent is informed, and knows that consumers know this, has an incentive
to exploit any informative price strategy by the incumbent. The role played by
assumption 4.2 implies a caveat – namely, that without the assumption, informa-
tion about an entrant could be valuable to the incumbent (as shown in the opening
example of this section).
5 Conclusion
In markets for search goods, an entrant can signal high quality by selecting a
high price. The reason is that a consumer who ﬁnds out that the entrant sells low
quality, will switch to the incumbent. However, fear of lock-in if the entrant sells
low quality may keep consumers from visiting the entrant.
The model demonstrates that the incumbent may not be able to beneﬁt from
knowing the type of the entrant. having less information, The entrant, who knows
that the incumbent can observe his type and that consumers realize this, may face
lessdifﬁcultyinconvincingconsumersofhighqualityundercommoninformation.
If the incumbent’s price is informative about the entrant’s quality, the entrant is
enabled to circumvent lock-in effects, that is, that he may enter independently of
the level of switching costs.
An interesting extension of the model would be to consider the choice of
location as a quality signal. Nelson [16] already argued that stores selling search
goods have an incentive to cluster. Recall that a price such that a consumer who
wouldobservelow qualityinthe entrant’sstoreswitches tothe incumbent,signals
that the entrant sells high quality. Thus if the cost of switching from the entrant
to the incumbent is low, consumers are more easily convinced of high quality.
Endogenizing switching costs, for example by the choice of location, would give
theentrantanadditionalinstrumentto signalhistype. Onemightthenexplainwhy
sellers often locate themselves near to each other, despite increased competition.
An example that comes immediately to mind is a fruit and vegetables market.
in the previous section) that “[:::] the entrant would be worse off if its type were known to the
incumbent” (footnote 4, p. 210).19
Another direction for further research would be to allow the incumbent to spy
a potential entrant, in order to observe his quality before the ﬁrms compete on the
product market. This information may, however, be of value to the incumbent.
The reason is that if spying remains undetected and the entrant is not sure whether
he has been investigated, the entrant cannot rely on the incumbent’s strategy to
signal his type.
Appendix





then ﬁrm 1 has no incentive to decrease its priceifq`−p1  qh+(1−)q `−p 
2
for all p1 2 (c`;p 
1). Equivalently,p
2  c` +(qh −q`). The latter condition must
also hold if p
1 = c`. Since any price p2 <c hsignals low quality, it must be that
p
2  ch. Combining these two constraints, it followsthat   (ch −c`)=(qh −q`)
must hold. There exists a p
1  c` that satisﬁes (8) if and only if   1.S i n c e
p 
2c `+  ( q h− q ` )<c `+q h−q `and p
1  c`, a sufﬁcient condition for
(7) is c` + qh − q`  q` − (q` − c`). The latter condition is equivalent to
  1. The equilibrium outcome can be supported by beliefs (p
1;p 2)for
all p2 2 (ch;q `−(q `−c `)).
(ii)Itmustbethatp






2  ch,   (ch − c`)=(qh − q`) must hold. Inequality (8) holds if and
only if   1.A s i n ( i ) ,  1implies (7). The equilibrium outcome can be
supported by beliefs (p
1;p 2)for all p2 2 (ch;p 
2)[(p 
2;q `−(q `−c `)).
Lemma 4.1 (Necessary condition in separating equilibria)
q` − p
1(qh)=q h−p 
2( q h) .
Proof: If q` − p
1(q`) >q h−p 
2 ( q h ) , then ﬁrm 1 can increase its price, a con-
tradiction. Therefore, q` − p
1(q`) <q h−p 
2( q h) .I f p 
1 ( q ` )6 =p 
1 ( q h ) , then there
exists a price p2 >p 
2( q h)such that q` − p
1(qh)  qh − p2 and p2 6= p
2(q`), that
is, (p
1(qh);p 2)is weakly consistent with qh, but not with q`.A c c o r d i n gt ot h er e -
ﬁnement criterion, (p
1(qh);p 2)=1 . Therefore, ﬁrm 2 can increase its price and20
attract consumers, a contradiction. Consequently, p
1  p
1(q`)=p 
1( q h ) .S i n c e
consumers visit the entrant in case of high quality, a low-quality entrant must not
be able to mimic a high type, that is, q` − p
2(qh) < ( q `−p 
1 )must hold. But
then any price p2 >p 
2( q h)satisﬁes q` − p2 < ( q `−p 
1) . By assumption 4.1, a
high-quality entrant has an incentive to increase his price, a contradiction.
Lemma 4.2 (Necessary conditions in separating equilibria)
Suppose that consumers observe (p
1(qh);p 




1( q h) , and
(ii) p
1 = c`, p
2(q`)=c `and p
2(qh)=c `+q h−q `.
Proof: (i) Suppose that p
1(q`) 6= p
1(qh). From lemma 4.1 and (1) it follows
that p
2(qh)=p 
1( q h)+q h−q ` >c h. There exists a price p2 <p 
2( q h)such that
(p
1(qh);p 2)is weakly consistent with qh, but not with q`. Thus (p
1(qh);p 2)=1 ,
and ﬁrm 2 can attract consumers by decreasing its price – a contradiction.
(ii) If p
1 >c `, then in case of q2 = q`, the entrant captures the market at a price
p
2(q`) just below p
1. There exists a price p1 2 (c1;p 
2(q `)) such that (p1;p 
2(q `)) is
weakly consistent with q`, but not with qh. Hence (p1;p 
2(q `)) = 0,a n dﬁ r m1
can increase its proﬁts by undercutting ﬁrm 2 after observing that q2 = q`,a
contradiction. Accordingly, it must be that p
1 = c`. Moreover, p
2(q`)=c `must
hold, since otherwise ﬁrm 1 would have an incentive to increase p
1(q`).F r o m
lemma 4.1 it follows that p
2(qh)=c `+q h−q `.
Lemma 4.3 (Necessary conditions in separating equilibria)
Suppose that consumers observe (p
1(qh);p 
2(q h)). If they visit ﬁrm 2 then
(i) either p
1(q`)=c `and p
2(q`)=c ` ;o rp 
1 ( q ` )=c `+q h−q `and p
2(q`)=
c `+ q h− q ` , and
(ii) p
1(qh)=c `and p
2(qh)=c `+q h−q `.
Proof: (In reverse order) (ii) Notice that p
1(qh)=c ` , otherwise ﬁrm 1 could
attract consumers by decreasing its price. By lemma 4.1,p
2(qh)=c `+q h−q `.
(i) First, suppose that p
2(q`) 6= p
2(qh).I f q `− p 
1 ( q ` )>q `−p 
2( q `)then, by the
reﬁnementcriterion,ﬁrm1 can increaseitsprice. Ifq`−p
1(q`) <q `−p 
2( q `) , then21
ﬁrm 2 can increase its price. Therefore it follows that q` − p
1(q`)=q `−p 
2( q `) .
From similar arguments it follows that p
1(q`)=c `and p
2(q`)=c `.
Second, suppose that p
2(q`)=p 
2 ( q h ) . Therefore, p
1(q`) >p 
1 ( q h ) .I f q ` −
p 
1 ( q ` ) >q `−p 
2 ( q ` )then the incumbent has an incentive to pretend that he
observed a low-quality entrant by selecting p
1(q`) if the entrant’s actual quality is
high. If q` − p
1(q`) <q `−p 
2( q `) , then ﬁrm 2 can increase its price. It follows
that q` − p
1(q`)=q `−p 
2 ( q ` )(and consumers visit the entrant). Accordingly
p
1(q`)=c `+q h−q `.
Proof of proposition 4.2:
In any pooling equilibrium, (7) and (8) must hold. Firm 1 should not have
an incentive to deviate with some price p1 >c ` .L e t  ( p 1 ;p 
2)=1for such
a deviation, so that it is sufﬁcient to require q` − p1  qh − p
2 for all p1 >c ` .
Equivalently,p
2  c`+qh−q`. Entryoccursonlyifq`−p
1  qh+(1−)q`−p
2.
E n t r yi sd e t e r r e do n l yi fq `−p 
1qh +(1−)q `−p 
2. Also, if entry is deterred
then p
1 = c`. The equilibrium outcomes can be supported by beliefs (p
1;p 2)
similar to those in the proof of proposition 3.2.
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